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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were 
among the firms most affected by the turning credit cycle (Ongena, Peydró and Van Horen, 
2013). As fears increased that credit-constrained SMEs could delay the long-awaited economic 
recovery (Chodorow-Reich, 2014), policy-makers increasingly focused their attention on 
initiatives to expand SME finance. For example, U.S. President Obama signed the Small 
Business Jobs Act, authorizing a program to boost small business credit. In the UK, the Bank of 
England launched a subsidized SME funding and guarantee scheme. The European Central 
Bank’s recent targeted long-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) was intended to stimulate 
eurozone bank lending to SMEs in particular. Beyond short-term crisis responses, the question 
remains open on how best to protect entrepreneurs in a more structural way from the cyclicality 
of credit. Some argue for countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies to stabilize the growth of 
firms that are (or can quickly become) credit constrained (Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and 
Manova, 2010). Others point towards a role for countercyclical capital buffers (Drehmann, 
Borio, Gambacorta, Jiménez and Trucharte, 2010 and Repullo, 2013). 
This paper analyzes an as yet underexplored aspect, the role of banks’ business models—in 
particular their use of relationship versus transaction lending—in determining the cyclicality of 
credit. We cull hitherto unavailable information on banks’ main lending techniques from 397 
face-to-face interviews with the “ultimate bank insiders”: their CEOs. Using this novel dataset, 
we analyze to what extent the local presence of relationship versus transaction banks impacts 
firms’ credit constraints at different stages of the credit cycle. Our focus is on emerging Europe, 
a region with substantial variation in the lending technologies that banks apply—both between 
and within countries—and therefore an ideal testing ground for our purposes. Unlike previous 
papers, we explore variation in the importance of bank lending techniques across the credit and 
business cycle. Our analysis includes both borrowing firms and firms that were either rejected or 
discouraged from applying for a loan. Using firm-level survey data on the need for loans also 
allows us to control for demand-side effects and to isolate the supply-side effect of different 
lending techniques across the credit cycle. 
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Relationship lending—banks repeatedly interacting with clients to obtain and exploit 
proprietary borrower information (Boot, 2000)—has long been seen as the appropriate tool for 
banks to reach out to SMEs. Compared with larger firms, SMEs—which are typically not 
publicly traded—are more opaque and less likely to be able to post collateral. These 
characteristics put a premium on private information at the core of the relationship between 
banks and SMEs. Such “soft” (unverifiable) information can be collected and updated through a 
long-term lending relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Stein, 
2002; Uchida, Udell and Yamori, 2012). Relationship lenders may therefore be better positioned 
to reach out to SMEs given their advantage in screening and monitoring opaque borrowers.  
Over the past decade, however, transaction or arm’s-length lending—which relies on “hard” 
(verifiable) information and assets—has been proposed as an alternative SME lending technique 
(Berger and Udell, 2006). Using transaction lending techniques that address problems of 
informational opacity—such as credit scoring, asset-based lending, and factoring—banks may 
assess repayment prospects even when informative financial statements are unavailable (Frame, 
Srinivasan and Woosley, 2001). 
Cross-country and country-specific evidence shows that banks can use both methods to reach 
out to smaller firms (De la Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2010; Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Martinez Peria, 2011). However, this research is cross-sectional and therefore cannot 
examine possible variation in the effectiveness of these lending techniques at various stages of 
the credit cycle. Theory, however, suggests that relationship lenders may play a prominent role 
in the continuation of lending during crisis times. In particular, previous work suggests an 
(implicit) insurance role of relationship lenders against adverse macroeconomic conditions (e.g., 
Berger and Udell, 1992; Berlin and Mester, 1999; Preece and Mullineaux, 1996). In addition, 
theory suggests that relationship lenders can acquire valuable information over the course of the 
lending relationship that allows them to adapt lending conditionality under changing conditions 
(Rajan, 1992; von Thadden, 1995). Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2013) show that 
as relationship banks learn about the borrower over time, they can continue to lend on more 
3 
 
favorable terms to profitable firms when a crisis hits and, consequently, relax firms’ credit 
constraints more in crisis times than transactional banks.  
Building on this literature, this paper combines several cross-country datasets to examine 
how different lending techniques co-vary with firms’ financing constraints at the peak and the 
trough of the credit cycle. To identify relationship and transaction banks we use a novel approach 
in which we employ information on bank lending techniques collected through face-to-face 
interviews with 397 bank CEOs as part of the EBRD’s Banking Environment and Performance 
Survey (BEPS). We merge this information on the use of lending techniques with firm-level 
survey information on firms’ financing constraints and with newly collected data on the 
geographic location of bank branches across 21 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus. These combined data allow us to capture with a high degree of accuracy the type of 
banks that surround each individual firm in our dataset and to identify, at the local level, the 
impact of relationship versus transaction lending on firms’ financing constraints over the credit 
cycle. This unique and detailed dataset also allows us to control for a large array of firm, bank 
and locality covariates. 
We find that a greater presence of relationship banks in the vicinity of the firm is associated 
with fewer firms being credit constrained in 2008-09—when the credit cycle had turned—but not 
in 2005—during the credit boom. This holds after controlling for bank ownership and bank 
health in the vicinity of the firm and for an array of firm characteristics. This result is robust to a 
range of specification tests and ways to address endogeneity. For 2008-09, we find that the 
impact of relationship banking on relaxing credit constraints is stronger for young, small, and 
non-exporting firms, firms with no other sources of external finance, and firms that lack tangible 
assets, i.e. firms that are more likely to be constrained in a credit cycle downturn. We also 
document that the alleviating impact of relationship banking on firms’ financing constraints is 
even stronger in those regions within a country that experienced a sharper business cycle 
downturn. Finally, we provide evidence that suggests that the local presence of relationship 
banks, and the associated alleviation of credit constraints, has a positive impact on firm growth 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and is not associated with evergreening of non-
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performing loans. As such, we interpret our findings as consistent with the hypothesis that 
relationship lending can be critical for alleviating firms’ financing constraints during an 
economic downturn. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to link the share of relationship banks 
active in the vicinity of firms to these firms’ credit constraints at different points of the credit 
cycle. Moreover, we are able to analyze these data in a cross-country context compared to 
previous country studies.
1
 In doing so, we contribute in several important ways to the extant 
literature. First, we introduce an innovative though straightforward way to classify bank lending 
techniques. Research on the impact of lending techniques on SME finance suffers from the 
problem that lending technologies are usually not identified and have to be proxied by, for 
example, the length or breadth of the bank-firm relationship or the distance between bank and 
firm. We, instead, elicit information from structured face-to-face interviews with the bank CEO 
which provides us with a direct measure of the lending technique used, without having to rely on 
(simplifying) assumptions about which banks use which technology. We test the robustness of 
our findings using alternative computations of this measure. 
Second, unlike studies using credit registry data, our firm survey data contain information 
about both borrowing and non-borrowing firms, with the latter split up in constrained versus 
non-constrained firms. This allows us to paint a more complete picture of credit constraints 
among the business population at large and to focus on supply-side effects while controlling for 
credit-demand shifts. Including non-borrowing firms in our analysis is critical in the region we 
study where the majority of firms do not use bank funding. Third, using cross-country data 
                                                        
1 Bolton et al. (2013) use data from the Italian credit registry from before and after the Lehman Brothers collapse, 
rely on the distance between the firm and the bank’s headquarters as a gauge of the lending technique 
involved, and show that firms closer to their banks’ headquarters were offered more favorable continuation 
lending terms and faced lower default rates. Sette and Gobbi (2014) use the same data source and find that longer 
bank-firm lending relationships resulted in more and cheaper credit after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In a 
similar vein, Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011) show that German banks affected by the global financial crisis were 
more likely to continue to lend to existing retail clients than to grant credit to as yet unknown loan applicants. 
5 
 
allows us to draw broader inferences from our findings than a one-country study. It also provides 
us the possibility to gauge the sensitivity of the relationship between banks’ lending models and 
firms’ financing constraints to different macroeconomic situations. Fourth, we also study 
whether the relaxing of firms’ credit constraints during the cyclical downturn, due to local 
relationship lending, has an impact on firms’ real outcomes. This provides important insights 
into the aggregate effects of different bank business models and allows us to distinguish between 
“zombie lending” and “helping hand” hypotheses of relationship lending (Caballero, Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 2008; Peek and Rosengren, 2005). 
Our paper is related to an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on relationship 
lending. This literature builds on modern banking theories that focus on the role of financial 
intermediaries as producers of private information (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Campbell and 
Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Broecker, 1990). Recent theoretical contributions highlight both 
the dark and the bright side of bank-firm relationships. Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (2004) 
show that by granting loans to firms, banks obtain an informational advantage over competitors, 
providing them with informational rents later in the relationship. Rajan (1992) and Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1994) introduce a bright side to relationship lending as the bank’s informational 
advantage allows it to enforce improved continuation or liquidation decisions.  
The empirical work on relationship banking is extensive.
2
 Key contributions show that firms 
having relationships with banks enjoy improved credit availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), 
are less likely to pledge collateral, and pay lower rates (Berger and Udell, 1995). Banks can re-
use borrower information when lending to the same firm and the more experienced banks 
become, the more they rely on this proprietary information (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). 
Relationship banks thus face fewer information problems, lower variable lending costs and may 
be more inclined to continue lending during a credit cycle downturn. We contribute to this 
literature by documenting firms’ benefits from relationship lending over the credit cycle. 
                                                        
2
 See for instance Berger and Udell (2002) and for a review Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) or Kysucky and 
Norden (2014). 
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In doing so, we also link to the work on the cyclicality of banks’ credit supply. Rajan (1994) 
shows that if banks focus excessively on short-term outcomes, they may exacerbate credit 
contractions by not funding some profitable projects. Ruckes (2004) provides a theoretical model 
to explain the fluctuation of bank credit policies over the business cycle. Because the proportion 
of creditworthy firms declines during recessions, banks need relatively precise information to 
identify these fewer good borrowers. If such information is unavailable, banks base their 
decisions on general economic conditions rather than individual borrower assessments, and lend 
less. Our results suggest that banks with different lending techniques also differ in their ability to 
generate useful borrower information and hence their ability to continue lending during a 
cyclical downturn. Our paper thus contributes to this literature by showing that the predominance 
of different lending techniques in a banking system has a first-order impact on the effect of a 
credit downturn on the real economy. 
Lastly, our paper contributes to the literature on firms’ financing constraints. Many papers 
follow Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and derive an empirical specification from the 
Euler equation that describes the firm’s optimal investment pattern. Financially constrained firms 
are seen as having a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity, an assumption that has been 
questioned, however (for example, Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). More recent papers focus on 
enterprise survey data and rely either on self-reported financing constraints (Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005) or combine information on actual financing patterns with demand 
for external finance (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008; Brown, Ongena, Popov and 
Yeşin, 2011; Popov and Udell, 2012).3 Our paper falls into the latter category. We add to this 
literature by relating firms’ financing constraints to banks’ business models at different points in 
the credit and business cycle. 
Before proceeding, we would like to address a few methodological concerns. First, our data 
do not allow us to observe actual lending relationships. By using data for both borrowing and 
non-borrowing firms, however, we are able to gauge the local general equilibrium impact of 
                                                        
3
 See also Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) who use survey information on whether households applied and 
were accepted for loans to construct a local indicator of financial development across Italian provinces. 
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banks’ lending techniques, which we would miss if only focusing on borrowing firms. Second, 
we rely on survey data both for firms and banks. While firm-level survey data have been widely 
used in the recent literature, there may be concerns about measurement error in firms’ responses 
to questions about why they do not apply for a loan or that rejection might simply reflect the lack 
of investment opportunities with positive NPV. We offer several robustness tests with different 
definitions and alternative measures of firms’ financing constraints. Critically, the use of firm-
level survey data allows us to capture a part of the enterprise population for which detailed 
balance sheet and income statement information is rarely available. And while bank-level survey 
responses to questions on lending techniques might suffer from some measurement error, there is 
no reason to believe that it biases our findings in a particular way. In addition, we offer 
alternative ways to compute the importance of relationship vs. transaction lending. Finally, our 
identification strategy relies on the location of banks and enterprises being independent of each 
other. We offer ample evidence in the paper that supports this assumption. Testing the 
differential effect of relationship lending across firms with different characteristics and regions 
that suffered from the crisis to a different extent provides additional possibilities to address the 
possible endogenous matching of firms and banks.  
We proceed as follows. The next section briefly documents the credit boom and bust in the 
region we study to set the stage for our empirical tests. Section 3 describes the data sources we 
combine, while Section 4 presents our identification strategy. Section 5 discusses our empirical 
results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Central and eastern Europe through boom and bust 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Central and Eastern Europe experienced a transformation of its 
banking systems in the 1990s and 2000s, partly driven by foreign bank entry but also by the 
building of the necessary institutions for market-based financial service provision. Perhaps the 
most important impact of foreign bank entry was the cutting of entrenched relationships between 
politically connected enterprises and the banking system (Berglöf and Roland, 1997). Combined 
with a rapid increase in cross-border funding flows, as capital accounts were liberalized, this 
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resulted in financial deepening throughout the region. Increases in aggregate financial depth 
indicators, such as private credit to GDP, were accompanied by a rising share of enterprises with 
access to banks for working and investment capital. 
With the onset of the global financial crisis, the persistently high credit growth rates 
witnessed in the region tumbled dramatically (Figure 1). While year-on-year credit growth 
amounted to between 35 and 40 percent per year over the period 2005-07, credit growth 
decelerated markedly in 2008 and even turned negative in 2009. Nominal credit growth then 
stabilized at a rate of around just 5 percent per year. This sharp change in macroeconomic 
conditions is also reflected in GDP growth, which dropped from an average 4.8 percent in 2008 
to -4.2 percent in 2009. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
This dramatically different macroeconomic and credit environment in 2005 and 2008-09 
provides the necessary contrast to compare firms’ financing constraints in these two periods and 
to relate them to banks’ business models. Yet, relating SMEs’ financing constraints to banks’ 
business models over the credit cycle has broader implications beyond the specific region we 
look at. SMEs have been hit especially hard by the global financial crisis and this holds across 
both Europe and the U.S. A recent policy report points to the lack of information about SMEs as 
well as banks’ disinvestments in front-end staff that interface directly with borrowers as reasons 
why banks are currently reluctant to lend to SMEs (IIF, 2013). This finding is in line with the 
idea that relationship lending might be a way to alleviate lending constraints during a downturn. 
 
3. Data 
We now introduce the main datasets that we combine to gauge the impact of banks’ business 
models on firms’ financing constraints over the business cycle. Our identification rests on joining 
three important pieces of information: data on firms’ credit constraints at different points in time; 
the geo-coordinates of the bank branches surrounding these firms; and—crucially—data on the 
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lending techniques of these banks. The data on firms’ real performance will be introduced in 
Section 5.6. 
 
3.1. Firm data: credit constraints and covariates 
We use the EBRD-World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) to measure the incidence of credit constraints among over 14,000 firms across 21 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (see Table 2 for a country list). Face-
to-face interviews were held with the owner or main manager of each of these enterprises. The 
purpose of the survey is to determine the extent to which different features of the business 
environment (including access to finance) constitute obstacles to firms’ operations. The survey 
also includes information on a large number of firm characteristics such as the number of 
employees, age, ownership, legal structure, export activity and industry. We also know the exact 
geographical location of each firm. 
Firms were selected using random sampling with three stratification levels to ensure 
representativeness across industry, firm size, and region. Due to stratification, the sample 
includes firms from all main non-agricultural industries, allowing us to use industry fixed effects 
in our regression framework. Stratification also yields more precise estimates. 
We use two BEEPs waves: one conducted in 2005 (7,053 firms) and one in 2008-09 (7,047 
firms, see Figure A1 in the Appendix). The first wave was thus undertaken at a time when 
emerging Europe experienced a credit boom, whereas the second survey took place about a year 
after the credit cycle had turned (Figure 1).
4
 This allows us to compare credit constraints at two 
very different points during the credit cycle, while keeping the rest of the firm environment—in 
particular the structure of the local banking landscape—constant. The sampling for both BEEPS 
rounds was independent and based on separate draws. This allows us to directly compare the 
parameter estimates generated by regression models that use the two samples.  
                                                        
4 In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the credit cycle started to turn as early as 2007 whereas in the other sample 
countries credit tapered off in the third quarter of 2008 (Berglöf, Korniyenko, Plekhanov and Zettelmeyer, 2010). 
10 
 
By combining answers to various questions, we first distinguish between firms with and 
without demand for credit. Among the former group, we can then identify firms that were credit 
constrained: those that were either discouraged from applying for a loan or were rejected when 
they applied (Cox and Japelli, 1993; Duca and Rosenthal, 1993). 
To gauge financing constraints at the firm level, we follow Popov and Udell (2012) and use 
BEEPS question K16: “Did the establishment apply for any loans or lines of credit in the last 
fiscal year?” For firms that answered “No”, we move to question K17, which asks: “What was 
the main reason the establishment did not apply for any line of credit or loan in the last fiscal 
year?” For firms that answered “Yes”, question K18a subsequently asks: “In the last fiscal year, 
did this establishment apply for any new loans or new credit lines that were rejected?” We 
classify firms that answered “Yes” to K16 and “No” to K18a as unconstrained as they were 
approved for a loan, while we classify firms as credit constrained if they either answered “Yes” 
to K18a (i.e. were rejected) or answered “Interest rates are not favorable”; “Collateral 
requirements are too high”; “Size of loan and maturity are insufficient”; or “Did not think it 
would be approved” to K17. This strategy allows us to differentiate between firms that did not 
apply for a loan because they did not need one and firms that did not apply because they were 
discouraged (but actually needed a loan). 
The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that 70 percent of all sample firms in 2005 needed 
a loan, while 62 percent did in 2008-09. Thirty-four percent of firms were financially constrained 
in 2005, while 40 percent were constrained in 2008-09, pointing to a substantial tightening of 
financing constraints in 2008-09. Given that demand declined and constraints increased between 
2005 and 2008-09, it is important to differentiate between both. Behind these averages lies 
substantial variation across and within countries (Table 2). While 12 percent of firms in Slovenia 
were financially constrained in 2005 and 17 percent in 2008-09, 64 percent of firms in 
Azerbaijan were financially constrained in 2005 and 78 percent in 2008-09. The variation over 
time also differs considerably across countries. While the share of financially constrained firms 
dropped in Belarus from 45 to 34 percent between 2005 and 2008-09, it increased from 28 to 50 
percent in Latvia. 
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[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
We next use the BEEPS survey to create firm-level control variables that we use throughout our 
analysis. These include firm size (Small firm and Large firm – making medium firms the base 
case); whether a firm is Publicly listed; is a Sole proprietorship; is a Former state-owned 
enterprise; is an Exporter; and whether a firm’s financial statements are Audited by an external 
auditor. Following the financing constraint literature, we expect that larger, publicly listed, and 
audited firms—all transparency proxies that should be inversely related to information 
asymmetries—face fewer credit constraints. Table 1 provides summary statistics of all variables 
and Appendix Table A1 gives their definitions and sources. In 2005, a bit more than half of the 
firms were small and a bit less than half were audited. Only few firms (2 percent) were publicly 
listed while 27 percent exported. 
 
3.2. Bank branch networks 
The next step in our data construction is to collect information on the bank branches in the 
vicinity of each firm. We need time-varying information to create an accurate picture of the 
branch networks in both 2005 and 2008-09.  
Such detailed information is not publicly available and we therefore hired a team of 
consultants with extensive banking experience to hand-collect these data. Information was 
gathered by either directly contacting the banks or by downloading data from bank websites. 
Information was subsequently double-checked with the bank as well as with the (more limited) 
information available in the SNL Financial database. We focus on branches that provide funding 
to SMEs, excluding those that only lend to households or large corporates.
5
 In some countries, 
such as Hungary and Ukraine, the central bank was able to provide current as well as historical 
geo-coordinates for all bank branches. For all countries we collected both contemporaneous and 
historical information on branch locations, the latter going back to 1995. This allows us to paint a 
                                                        
5
 Banks were asked to provide information on which of their branches engage in SME lending. 
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(gradually changing) picture of the branching landscape in each year over the period 1995-2011. 
Changes over time reflect branch closures and openings, either incrementally by existing banks 
or in step-wise fashion when banks entered or exited the market. 
In total our dataset contains the geo-coordinates of 38,310 bank branches operated by 422 
banks (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). These banks represent 96.8 percent of all bank assets in 
these 21 countries.
6
 We merge this information with two other datasets: Bureau Van Dijk’s 
BankScope, to get balance sheet and income statement data for each of these banks, and the 
Claessens and Van Horen (2014) database on bank ownership to determine whether a bank is 
foreign or domestic owned. A bank is classified as foreign owned if at least half of its equity is in 
foreign hands. For each foreign bank we also identify the name and city of incorporation of the 
parent bank. 
We connect the firm and branch data in two ways. First, after making sure that the names of 
localities (cities and towns) are spelled consistently in both datasets, we match firms and 
branches by locality. For instance, we link all BEEPS firms in Brno, the second largest city of 
the Czech Republic, to all bank branches in Brno.
7
 The assumption is that a firm has access to all 
branches in the locality where it is based. Second, we draw circles with a radius of 5 or 10 
kilometers around the geo-coordinates of each firm and then link the firm to all branches inside 
that circle.
8
 On average, a locality in our dataset contains 21 bank branches in 2008 whereas a 
circle with a 5 (10) kilometer radius contains 18 (30) branches. This reflects that most of the 
localities in our dataset are relatively large towns and cities. For instance, Brno covers an area of 
                                                        
6
 Unweighted country average. Total bank assets as taken from BankScope for the year 2007.  
7
 Only very few firms are based in a locality without any bank branches. We link these firms to the branches in the 
nearest locality. Excluding them from the analysis does not impact any of our results. 
8 According to the president of the Italian Bankers’ Association “the banker’s rule of thumb is to never lend to a 
client located more than three miles from his office” (quoted in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004). The median 
Belgian SME borrower in Degryse and Ongena (2005) is located 2.5 kilometers (1.6 miles) from the lending bank’s 
branch. In the U.S. data sets of Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) this median distance 
amounted to 3.7 kilometers (2.3 miles) and 4.2 kilometers (2.6 miles), respectively. 
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230 km
2
. This exceeds the surface of a 5 km circle (79 km
2
) but is smaller than the surface of a 
10 km circle (314 km
2
). Consequently, the typical number of branches in our localities lies 
somewhere between that of a 5 km circle and that of a 10 km circle. Our main analysis uses the 
locality variables but we will show that our results are very similar when using the alternative 
(circle) measures of spatial firm-bank closeness. 
 
3.3. Measuring banks’ lending techniques 
We now have identified the bank branches that surround each sample firm. The third and final 
step in our data construction is to create variables at the locality (or circle) level that measure the 
key characteristics of these banks. All of these locality-level bank variables are averages 
weighted by the number of branches that a bank operates in the locality. 
The main variable of this type, Share relationship banks, measures the share of bank 
branches in a locality that are owned by relationship banks as opposed to transaction banks. To 
create this variable we turn to the second Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS 
II), jointly undertaken by the EBRD and Tilburg University.
9
 As part of BEPS II a common 
questionnaire in either English or the local language was administered during a face-to-face 
interview with 397 CEOs of banks operating in the countries in our sample. The interviews were 
undertaken by a specialized team of senior financial consultants, each with considerable first-
hand banking experience. The interviewed banks represent 80.1 percent of all bank assets in the 
21 sample countries. 
For our current purposes, we use BEPS question Q6, where CEOs were asked to rate on a 
five-point scale the importance (frequency of use) of the following techniques when dealing with 
SMEs: relationship lending; fundamental and cash-flow analysis; business collateral; and 
personal collateral (personal assets pledged by the entrepreneur). 
Although, as expected, almost all banks find building a relationship (knowledge of the client) 
of some importance to their lending, about 60 percent of the banks in the sample find building a 
                                                        
9
 For more details: http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/beps.shtml. 
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relationship “very important”, while the rest considers it only “important” or “neither important 
nor unimportant”. We categorize the former group of banks as relationship banks. 
Question Q6 does not refer to a specific date. However, Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz 
(2012) have shown that bank business models hardly change over time. Indeed, when we 
enquired with a set of CEOs they confirmed that “these things do not change”.10 Also, due to 
technological developments, such as small business credit-scoring, that make it easier for banks 
to process hard information on small firms, any gradual change in bank lending techniques has 
likely been in the direction of transactions-based lending (Berger, Frame, and Miller, 2005; 
Berger and Udell, 2006). This would bias our results against finding a mitigating effect of 
relationship lending, as it makes it more likely that even though we now code a bank as a 
transaction lender it might have used more relationship lending techniques in the recent past. To 
more formally address this issue, we perform a robustness test (discussed in Section 5.2), where 
we limit our analysis to banks that were not involved in a merger or acquisition—events that may 
impact lending techniques—and show that our results continue to hold. 
Interestingly, relationship banking is prevalent among both domestic and foreign banks. 
Indeed, while 51 percent of the domestic banks identify themselves as relationship banks, this 
percentage is even higher among foreign banks (64 percent). In other words, the traditional 
dichotomy between domestic (=relationship) banks and foreign (=transaction) banks that is often 
(implicitly) assumed in the literature does not seem to hold in practice—at least not in our 
sample of 21 countries. 
While on average 64 percent of all foreign banks are relationship banks, there is variation 
between and within multinational banking groups in the lending techniques of their subsidiaries. 
For instance, only one in three subsidiaries of one of the large Italian banks in our dataset is a 
                                                        
10 Additional data from the BEPS survey back up this assertion. We asked CEOs to rate, for 2007 and 2011, the 
importance of (i) training bank staff and (ii) introducing new IT technologies. Both activities may be related to 
changes in lending techniques. The survey answers reveal no strong shift in the prevalence of these activities over 
time. When we distinguish between relationship and transactional banks, we find that this holds for both bank types. 
This gives us further confidence that lending techniques are stable over time. 
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relationship bank. In contrast, around 75 to 90 percent of the subsidiaries of some Austrian and 
French banking groups are relationship banks. Notwithstanding this specialization of 
multinational banks in the lending techniques they employ abroad, we do not observe any large 
banking groups that exclusively rely on either relationship or transaction lending throughout their 
whole subsidiary network.
11
 
When we compare balance sheet and branching characteristics of relationship and transaction 
banks we do not find systematic significant differences (Table 3). Within the group of domestic 
banks, those with above-median levels of wholesale funding are less likely to be relationship 
banks (p-value: 0.11). In line with the theoretical model by Bolton et al. (2013), relationship 
banks are also somewhat overrepresented among better-capitalized banks (p-value: 0.12). 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Banks with more extensive branch networks are somewhat more likely to be relationship lenders 
(p-value: 0.06), both among domestic (p-value: 0.22) and foreign banks (p-value: 0.20). Foreign 
banks that are smaller in terms of total assets are also a bit more likely to be relationship lenders 
(p-value: 0.22). Overall, we thus find no strong relationship between banks’ size and their focus 
on relationship versus transaction lending. This is in line with the findings of Berger, Goulding 
and Rice (2014) who show that small opaque U.S. firms are as likely to have a large, 
multimarket bank as their relationship bank as a small, local bank. We come back to the role of 
bank size in Section 5.2. We also find no clear differences in terms of other funding indicators, 
the proportion of branches outside a country’s main cities, the average distance between 
branches and their headquarters, or the number of hierarchical levels involved in SME credit 
approval decisions.
12
 
                                                        
11
 While it is likely that lending techniques vary across subsidiaries of multi-national banks, it is much less likely 
that lending techniques vary within a subsidiary, as screening and approval methodologies are typically set centrally.  
12
 The incentives of local officers may be less aligned with those of the headquarters if the within-bank distance is 
longer, thus exacerbating internal agency problems (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Liberti and Mian (2009) find that 
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After having identified relationship lenders, we create a variable that equals the share of 
relationship banks in the locality of each firm, weighted by the number of branches each bank 
has in the locality. This allows us to answer the question: are firms in a locality in which 
relatively many relationship banks are present less credit constrained during a cyclical downturn? 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that, on average, the share of relationship-based 
banks was 53 percent in 2005 and 50 percent in 2008-09. This share, however, varies 
significantly across countries, from 90 percent in the Czech Republic to 19 percent in Georgia 
(Table 2, 2008-09). Even more important for our identification purposes is that there is 
substantial variation in relationship banking within countries.
13
 
This point is visualized more comprehensively in Figure 2 which shows a heat map of the 
importance of relationship banking in each of the localities where at least one BEEPS firm is 
based. Darker colors indicate a higher proportion of branches owned by relationship banks as 
opposed to transaction banks. The map shows that while relationship banking becomes 
somewhat less prevalent going further east, there is substantial variation within the 21 individual 
countries. This is exactly the cross-locality variation that we exploit in the remainder of this 
paper to test the conjecture that relationship banking alleviates credit constraints during a 
cyclical downturn. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Analogously to our definition of the locality-level relationship banking variable (Share 
relationship banks), we also construct a rich set of control variables that measure other aspects of 
the local banking landscape. In particular, we measure for each firm the average Tier 1 ratio of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
when the hierarchical distance between the information-collecting officer and the manager that approves a loan is 
large, less soft and more hard information is used. 
13
 This variation is largely unrelated to the local presence of foreign banks. For instance, while foreign banks own 
about 25 percent of the branches in the Moldovan cities of Orhei and Ceadir-Lunga, the share of relationship banks 
in Orhei is relatively low at 40 percent whereas it amounts to 100 percent in Ceadir-Lunga. 
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the surrounding banks (Tier 1, as in Popov and Udell, 2012), the average use of wholesale 
funding by these banks (gross loans to customer funding ratio) (Wholesale funding), and the 
share of foreign-owned banks (Share foreign banks). By doing so, we control for both the 
ownership and funding structure of the banks in a locality as both of these characteristics may 
independently impact firms’ access to credit. As mentioned before, the dichotomy of relationship 
versus transaction lending has often been equated with the dichotomy of domestic versus foreign 
bank ownership (Mian, 2006; Beck, Ioannidou and Schäfer, 2012). It is therefore important to 
control for local bank ownership to prevent this variable from confounding our estimates of the 
impact of local relationship lending. 
 
4. Methodology 
To estimate the relationship between the share of relationship banks in the vicinity of a firm and 
the probability that the firm is credit constrained, we use the following baseline model for both 
the 2005 and 2008-09 cross-section. Comparing the results for the two cross-sections allows us 
to evaluate the importance of relationship banking over the credit cycle. We hypothesize that 
relationship banks were particularly helpful once the cycle had turned in 2008. Consider the 
model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑘 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑙++𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 (1) 
 
where  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i in locality j of country k in industry l is credit 
constrained (rejected or discouraged), and zero otherwise.  is a matrix of firm covariates to 
control for observable firm-level heterogeneity: Small firm, Large firm, Publicly listed, Sole 
proprietorship, Privatized, Exporter and Audited. is a matrix of bank characteristics in 
locality j of country k: bank solvency (Tier 1), Share foreign banks and Wholesale funding. This 
matrix of locality characteristics also includes dummies to identify capitals and cities (localities 
ijklY
ijklX
jkL
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with at least 50,000 inhabitants). Firms in cities may face different constraints than firms in the 
countryside. We further saturate the model with country and industry fixed effects  and  to 
wipe out (un)observable variation at these aggregation levels. We cluster error terms at the 
country-level, thus allowing for errors to be correlated across firms within a country reflecting 
possible country-specific unobserved factors. 
Our main independent variable of interest is Share relationship banksjk, the share of bank 
branches in locality j of country k that belong to banks for which relationship banking is “very 
important” when dealing with SMEs. We are interested in β3 which can be interpreted as the 
impact of the intensity of relationship banking on firms’ credit constraints. 
We present probit regressions both with and without a first-stage Heckman selection equation 
where the need for a loan is the dependent variable. Since in our sample a firm’s credit constraint 
is only observable if the firm expresses the need for a loan, we follow Popov and Udell (2012) 
and Hainz and Nabokin (2013) and rely on additional variables that are excluded from Equation 
(1) for the identification of the model. Specifically, we use a dummy that indicates if the firm 
judges competition to be “fairly severe”, “severe”, or “very severe”; and a dummy that is one if 
over the last three years the firm received subsidies from a local or national government or the 
EU. The economic intuition is that competitive markets reduce mark-ups and therefore firms’ 
ability to finance investments internally.
14
 All else equal, firms will then demand more external 
funding. A firm’s application for a subsidy may also signal that it is in need of external funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14
 See Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) on how higher price-cost mark-ups may allow firms to generate more 
internal funds and invest more. 
kC lI
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5. Empirical results 
5.1. Baseline results 
We start our empirical analysis by summarizing in Table 4 the results of our Heckman selection 
equation. The dependent variable is a dummy that is one if the firm has a demand for bank credit 
and zero otherwise. The probit specification includes our two exogenous variables―Competition 
and Received subsidies―alongside our standard set of firm and locality covariates (unreported). 
We also include Share relationship banks, our key locality-level variable that we use as a credit-
supply shifter in the next stage of our analysis. We saturate the model with country and industry 
fixed effects. 
As expected, both Competition and Received subsidies are positively and significantly 
correlated with a firm's demand for credit.
15
 Importantly, we find no relationship, neither in 2005 
nor in 2008-09, between our local bank-structure variable and the demand for credit (either at the 
level of the firm locality or at the 5 (10) km circle around the firm). This gives us confidence that 
Share relationship banks is not endogenous to local demand conditions and hence a good 
candidate to subsequently identify shifts in the supply of credit. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Next, in Table 5 we present regression specifications in line with Equation 1 to estimate the 
impact of the local presence of relationship banks on firms’ access to debt. We first show results 
for 2005—the time of the credit boom—and then for 2008-09—when the credit cycle had turned. 
For each period we present three probit regressions (at the locality level and with different sets of 
control variables) and then three second-stage Heckman regressions (at the level of the firm 
locality or the 5 (10) km circle around the firm). All models again include both country and 
industry fixed effects. 
                                                        
15
 When we include both variables in the subsequent estimation of Equation 1, they are―as expected―not 
correlated with firms’ access to credit in either 2005 or 2008-09. In other words, they act solely as demand shifters. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The results in Table 5 show no significant relationship between the local importance of 
relationship lending and firms’ financing constraints in 2005 but a strong and significantly 
negative relationship in 2008-09. When the credit cycle had turned, firms in localities with 
relatively many relationship banks were less constrained than observationally similar firms in 
localities with few relationship banks. The economic magnitude of this effect is substantial: 
moving from a locality with 20 percent relationship banks to one with 80 percent relationship 
banks reduces the probability of being credit constrained in 2008-09 by 26 percentage points 
(column 10). These findings are large given that 40 percent of firms report to be constrained in 
2008-09. Our results are consistent across different matching procedures between banks and 
firms (locality or circle) and controlling for selection bias with the Heckman procedure or not. 
They also hold controlling for a large number of enterprise characteristics and other 
characteristics of the banks in the respective location.
16
 
Several of the control variables enter significantly and with coefficient signs consistent with 
the literature. Compared with medium-sized firms, small (large) firms are more (less) likely to be 
financially constrained. Exporters and audited firms are less likely to experience credit 
constraints. These results hold for both survey waves, reflecting that firm opaqueness tends to 
cause agency problems in both good and bad times. Publicly listed firms became more 
constrained during the crisis than non-listed firms, most likely reflecting the drying up of 
alternative funding sources. Similarly, sole proprietorships were significantly more constrained 
during 2008-09 but not during 2005. 
                                                        
16 Our results also remain quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged when we control for local economic activity as 
proxied by the 2005 gross cell product (in US$ at market exchange rates). Here cells are terrestrial grids of 1 degree 
longitude by 1 degree latitude (approximately 100x100 km). Data source: Yale University G-Econ Project. As these 
data are not available for all the countries in our sample, we control for local economic development through capital 
and city dummies. 
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Few of the locality-level control variables enter significantly. In line with Popov and Udell 
(2012), we find that firms in localities with branches of less solvent banks (lower Tier 1 ratio) 
experience tighter credit constraints in 2008-09, though the coefficients never enter significantly 
at the 5 percent level. We also control for the local share of foreign-owned banks and the average 
reliance of local banks on wholesale funding. These variables do not explain anything over and 
above our relationship-banking measure. Finally, in the second-stage Heckman regressions 
(columns 4-6 and 10-12) the inverse Mills’ ratio does not enter significantly, indicating that 
selection bias does not distort our probit results. 
 
5.2. Robustness tests 
Tables 6 and 7 present various tests to gauge the robustness of our core results as presented in 
columns 4 and 10 of Table 5. We first examine the sensitivity of our results to various 
permutations in variable definitions in Table 6. Columns 1 to 6 show the results of regressions 
where we use alternative indicators of relationship lending. In the first two columns we use each 
bank’s score (on a five-point scale) to the question how important relationship banking is for 
SME lending and take the branch-weighted average by locality: Relationship banks (continuous). 
The average score was relatively stable between 2005 and 2008-09 at 3.39 and 3.38, 
respectively. Our findings are confirmed: the share of relationship banks enters negatively and 
significantly in 2008-09 but positively and insignificantly in 2005. 
In columns 3 and 4, we then use a relative measure of the local importance of relationship 
lending. We divide each bank’s score for relationship lending by the score for fundamentals-
based and cash-flow lending: Relationship Banks (relative to other lending techniques). This 
relative indicator of relationship lending averaged 0.93 in both 2005 and 2008-09. It again enters 
negatively and significantly (at the 10 percent level) in 2008-09 but not in 2005. 
In columns 5 and 6, we now define Relationship banks (relative to retail borrowers) as the 
share of branches in a locality that are owned by banks for whom relationship lending is a very 
important technique when lending to SMEs but not for retail borrowers. In this way we focus on 
banks that find relationship lending especially important for the types of borrowers in our 
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sample. Our results continue to hold when using this alternative definition. Lastly, in two 
additional unreported robustness tests we measure the local importance of relationship lending 
either as a dummy variable that is “1” if at least one relationship bank is present in a locality or, 
alternatively, as the number (rather than the share) of relationship banks. In both cases our results 
continue to go through. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In columns 7 and 8, we take a different approach and construct the variable Share transaction 
banks. This is the percentage of branches in a locality that are owned by banks for whom 
fundamental analysis and cash-flow based lending is a "very important" lending technique and 
for whom relationship lending is not "very important". While the local presence of transaction 
banks did not matter before the crisis, we find that a larger presence of these banks led to more 
intense credit constraints during the downturn. This mirrors, and hence corroborates, our findings 
on the beneficial impact of banks that consider themselves relationship lenders. 
In columns 9 and 10, we use a narrower definition of credit constraints where we do not 
consider firms that are discouraged due to high interest rates to be constrained.
17
 We again find 
the same results. Lastly, in columns 11 and 12, we use an alternative (and inverse) credit-
constrained variable which measures the percentage of a firm’s fixed assets financed through 
bank credit. As expected, we find that in 2008-09 firms in localities with more relationship 
lenders have a higher proportion of assets funded through bank loans. This supports our baseline 
finding that these firms were less credit constrained. In 2005 this effect is negative at the 10 
percent significance level, suggesting that firms in localities with many transaction banks had 
easier access to credit during the boom period. This is in line with the positive (but imprecisely 
estimated) impact of relationship lending on our baseline credit-constrained measure in 2005. 
                                                        
17 Firms that complain about too high interest rates might simply not have projects with a sufficiently high 
return on investment.  
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In Table 7 we then subject our main results to a battery of robustness tests related to our 
empirical specification or the composition of our sample. In the first two columns we re-estimate 
these base specifications while clustering the standard errors at the locality rather than the 
country level. We continue to find no impact in 2005 but a strong impact of relationship lending 
in 2008. While clustering by locality is appealing in principle, there are many localities with just 
one firm. In those cases locality clustering amounts to not clustering the standard errors at all. 
Overall, country-level clustering is therefore the more conservative approach. In columns 3 and 4 
we report the results of a linear probability (OLS) model so that we can calculate standard errors 
using the conservative wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008) 
to explicitly take into account our relatively small number of clusters. Our results continue to 
hold at the same significance level if we use these bootstrapped standard errors. 
In columns 5 to 10 we then add additional locality-level banking variables. Theory posits that 
relationship lenders rely on market power and are more likely to flourish in concentrated markets 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995) while other papers have explored the relationship between market 
structure, competition, and firms’ financing constraints (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Makisimovic, 2004; Love and Martinez Peria, 2015). We therefore control for several measures 
of market structure and market power. The first two proxy for the level of concentration and 
competition in the local credit market: a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and a (branch-
weighted) Lerner index. In both cases our main results continue to hold. Importantly, we find 
that while the HHI has no impact on credit constraints in 2005, a more concentrated credit 
market worsens credit access during the crisis. This effect materializes over and above the 
beneficial impact of a relatively high local proportion of relationship banks. 
In columns 9 and 10 we control for the share of branches owned by small banks, here defined 
as banks with a balance sheet of less than EUR 1 billion (as in Berger, Cerqueiro and Penas, 
2014). To the extent that small banks are better able to overcome information asymmetries vis-à-
vis small and medium-sized businesses (Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2001; Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005) we expect a negative impact on credit constraints, in particular 
during crisis times. We indeed find a negative but imprecisely estimated coefficient. Importantly, 
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controlling for local bank size (in addition to controlling for local bank ownership and funding 
structure) does not affect our baseline results on the importance of relationship lending. Finally, 
in unreported regressions we also control for the number of bank branches in the locality. This 
does not influence the statistical or economic significance of our results either. 
In column 11, we pool the 2005 and 2008-09 observations and include an interaction term 
between the share of relationship banks and a 2008-09 dummy. We now test directly whether the 
impact of relationship lending increases significantly during a cyclical downturn. The 
insignificant coefficient on the share of relationship banks and the statistically significant 
negative coefficient for the interaction term confirm that the impact of the local presence of 
relationship banks is indeed limited to the downturn.
18
 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
In columns 12 and 13 we drop the largest country in our sample, Ukraine, to make sure our 
findings are not driven by this single country. Again, we confirm our findings.
19
 In unreported 
regressions, we also split the sample between European Union and non-European Union 
countries and, alternatively, ran a specification where we interact our relationship banking 
variable with an EU-country dummy. We find that the impact of the local presence of 
relationship banks is equally strong in both country groups. This suggests that the protective 
impact of relationship lending operates independently of the level of economic development, 
adding to the external validity of our results. 
Finally, in column 14-15, we exclude banks that experienced an ownership change during 
our sample period when computing Share relationship banks. We confirm our findings for this 
                                                        
18
 While the 2005 and 2008-09 waves of the BEEPS survey contain some firms that were interviewed in both waves, 
this sub-sample is too small to obtain sensible coefficient estimates.  
19
 Similarly, our results hold when we exclude Poland – another large country – or the three relatively peripheral 
countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
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group of banks whose lending techniques have arguably been the most stable over time (cf. 
Section 3.3). 
 
5.3. Addressing endogeneity 
We next gauge whether our findings may to some extent be driven by endogeneity. The 
insignificant coefficient of the share of relationship banks in the loan demand regressions of 
Table 4 is reassuring. It suggests that relationship banks did not select into localities with a 
higher demand for external finance during 2005 or 2008-09. However, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that new firms selected into localities with a higher share of relationship banks to 
secure funding throughout the credit cycle. We therefore re-run our regressions dropping firms 
that were established either less than five years ago or less than 12 years ago (the median firm 
age in our sample). Columns 1 to 4 of Table 8 report our results. Our findings are confirmed, 
with the share of relationship banks entering positively and insignificantly for the 2005 
regressions and negatively and significantly for the 2008-09 ones. 
The regressions in columns 5 to 8 show the robustness of our findings by replacing the 
current branch-weighted share of relationship banks with the historical branch-weighted share of 
relationship banks in either 1995 or 2000. Using the lagged value of relationship banks in a 
locality reduces the risk that our findings are driven by relationship banks entering localities to 
serve firms with a higher need for external finance. This exercise confirms our previous findings 
of a positive and insignificant relationship in 2005 and a negative and significant relationship in 
2008. In unreported robustness tests, we instrument the shares of relationship banks in 2005 and 
2008 with the share of relationship banks in 1995 and again confirm our findings. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we ran an (unreported) locality-level regression where 
the dependent variable is Share relationship banks in 2008. We then assess to what extent a 
battery of locality-level characteristics of the local firm population can explain the presence of 
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relationship banks. We also include country fixed effects and control for industry composition. If 
the local presence of relationship banks would to a large extent be driven by the composition of 
the business sector in a specific locality, then we should find significant relationships between 
our firm characteristics averaged at the locality level and the share of relationship banks, the 
dependent variable. However, we do not find any significant relationship between, on the one 
hand, the share of small firms, the share of large firms, the share of sole proprietorships, the 
share of privatized firms, the share of exporters, or the share of audited firms and, on the other 
hand, the relative presence of relationship banks. We find only one marginally significant 
positive relationship, at the 10 percent level, between the share of publicly listed firms and the 
share of relationship banks. When we conduct an F-test for the joint significance of these 
locality-level firm characteristics, we cannot reject the null of no systematic relationship between 
firm characteristics and the presence of relationship banks (p-value: 0.25). We conclude that the 
presence of relationship banks in a specific locality appears to be unrelated to a large set of 
observable locality characteristics. 
Lastly, we follow Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and Bellows and Miguel (2009) to assess 
the relative importance of possible omitted variable bias. Intuitively, what we do is to analyze 
how the coefficient for Share relationship banks changes once we include our rich set of firm-
level and locality-level covariates. If this change is substantial, then it is more likely that adding 
more (currently unobservable) covariates would further reduce the estimated impacts. In 
contrast, if coefficients turn out to be stable when adding controls, then we can more confidently 
interpret our coefficient in a causal sense. We measure coefficient stability by calculating the 
ratio between the value of the coefficient in the regression including controls (numerator) and the 
difference between this coefficient and the one derived from a regression without covariates 
(denominator). This ratio shows how strong the covariance between the unobserved factors 
explaining firms’ credit constraints and the local share of relationship banks needs to be, relative 
to the covariance between observable factors and the share of relationship banks, to explain away 
the entire effect we find. 
27 
 
This ratio amounts to -4.39 and -35 for the specifications in columns 8 (Heckman) and 7 
(probit) of Table 5, respectively.
20
 The negative sign indicates that the coefficient for the share of 
relationship banks actually slightly increases when we add covariates, suggesting that our 
estimates somewhat underestimate the true causal effect. We conclude that it is unlikely that 
unobserved heterogeneity can explain away the protective impact of local relationship lending 
that we document. 
 
5.4. Firm heterogeneity 
Theory predicts that relationship lending is especially important for small and relatively opaque 
firms. However, it is a priori not clear whether relationship banks will continue lending to such 
firms during a credit downturn or focus on larger and less opaque firms. In Table 9 we therefore 
present regressions to estimate how the impact of the local presence of relationship banks on 
access to credit varies across different firm types. We interact the share of relationship banks 
with the number of employees; the age of the firm; its exporter status; a dummy variable 
indicating whether a firm is audited; a dummy that indicates whether a firm is likely to have 
access to funding from the state, a foreign parent, or the stock market; a dummy that indicates 
whether the firm is publicly listed; and a dummy that indicates whether the firm is in an industry 
with above-median levels of tangible assets.
21
 All specifications include our standard set of firm 
and locality controls as well as country and industry fixed effects (not reported). 
It is striking that almost none of these interaction effects is precisely estimated in 2005 while 
in 2008 the link between the importance of relationship lending and firms’ financing constraints 
consistently varies across firm groups in line with theory. Indeed, we find the negative 
                                                        
20
 When we re-estimate the model with linear probability OLS, the Altonji ratio even amounts to -51, indicating that 
the parameter stability is independent of the estimation method used. By way of comparison, Altonji, Elder and 
Taber (2005) estimate a ratio of 3.55 which they interpret as evidence that unobservables are unlikely to explain the 
entire effect they document. 
21
 Asset tangibility indicates whether the firm is part of an industry that is characterized by relatively high (above 
median) levels of tangible assets (properties, plants and equipment). See Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
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relationship between relationship lending and credit constraints during a crisis to be stronger for 
smaller and younger firms, non-exporting and non-audited firms, firms without access to non-
bank external funding, non-listed firms, and firms with few tangible assets. This is consistent 
with both the financing constraints literature that has shown that these firms suffer more from 
market frictions in their access to external finance as well as the literature that shows that 
relationship lending is more important for smaller, younger and non-exporting firms, firms with 
less transparent financial statements and those with less access to public external funding. These 
results expand on previous findings, however, by confirming that relationship lenders do not shy 
away from such firms during a credit downturn.  
In unreported specifications, we also include locality fixed effects (but drop industry effects). 
While the Share relationship banks becomes encompassed by these locality effects, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms of Share relationship banks and our firm characteristics in 
2008 are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 8 (with Employees, External funding 
and Publicly listed statistically different from zero). Note that these regressions also allow us to 
absorb any unobserved locality-level variation. 
The economic impact of this firm heterogeneity is substantial too. For instance, when we 
compare two otherwise similar firms, one of which is audited and one of which is not, then the 
probability of being credit constrained in 2008-09 was 36 percentage points higher for the 
unaudited firm in a locality without any relationship banks but only 20 percentage points higher 
in a locality where at least half of all branches are operated by relationship banks. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In short, smaller, younger and more opaque firms with less collateral to pledge faced more 
constraints in accessing credit during the credit crunch and we observe that these firms became 
especially constrained in localities where relationship banks are few and far between. We note 
that the significant interaction effects in 2008-09 also further reduce endogeneity concerns and 
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suggest that our base specification indeed picks up a causal effect of the local prevalence of 
relationship lending on access to credit. 
 
5.5. Relationship banking and regional business cycle variation 
The effect of relationship lending may not only vary across firms with different characteristics 
but also with the macroeconomic environment in which they operate. In Table 10 we analyze 
whether relationship lending is particularly beneficial to firms in regions that experience a more 
severe economic downturn. To this end we interact our local measure of relationship lending 
with output growth in 2008-09 or 2007-09, exploiting new data on regional growth patterns.
22
 
In the first two columns we measure output growth at the country level (real GDP growth) 
whereas in columns 3 and 4 we measure output growth at the level of the region where the firm 
is based. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we present a mixed approach where we measure output 
growth at the regional level where available and at the country level elsewhere. The local GDP 
data are consistently measured at the most disaggregated administrative level (typically states or 
provinces) available from local sources or, alternatively, at the lowest statistical division level, 
such as Eurostat’s NUTS level. 
The results in Table 10 confirm that the protective effect of the local presence of relationship 
banks was particularly strong in those regions that were hit relatively hard by the 2007-09 
financial crisis. With the exception of column (1), the interaction terms of the share of 
relationship banks with economic growth enter positively and significantly, suggesting that firms 
in areas with stronger negative growth benefited more in terms of fewer financing constraints if 
the share of relationship banks was higher in 2008. Relationship lending is thus especially 
important in more adverse macroeconomic environments. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
                                                        
22
 Regional GDP growth data were not available for Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Serbia. See 
Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2014) for more details on the regional data. 
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5.6. Real-economic impact 
Our analysis so far shows that a greater local presence of relationship banks is associated with 
fewer credit constraints among firms during an economic downturn. This begs the question 
whether the presence of relationship lending helps sound firms to bridge difficult times (as in 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994) and to recover more quickly or, in contrast, whether it reflects 
‘evergreening’ as banks roll over loans to underperforming borrowers (as in Caballero, Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2008). Do our findings point to a helping hand or to zombie lending? While 
previous research has shown that Japanese banks tended towards evergreening during the 
banking crisis of the 1990s, this issue has again become critical in the Eurozone crisis. We assess 
the real-economic repercussions of relationship lending for emerging Europe.  
To answer this question, we need more detailed information on our BEEPS sample regarding 
real-economic variables at the firm level. We therefore merge our sample with additional data on 
these firms from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database. We match on both firm and locality name. 
An algorithm identified perfect matches based on both names as well as near-matches.
23
 The 
latter were then manually checked for possible matches. For Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
matching was impossible due to limited coverage in Orbis. For all other countries we matched 
2,966 BEEPS firms―almost 50 percent―to their Orbis counterpart. The success rate varied 
from 20 percent in Romania to 77 percent in Slovenia. 
Data coverage in Orbis varies across variables and years and we therefore focus on three 
basic firm-growth indicators that are well covered: the (log) change in total assets, the (log) 
change in operating revenues (sales or turnover), and the (log) change in the number of 
employees. We measure these changes over the period 2005-07 as well as 2008-10. Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics and Appendix Table A1 the exact definitions and sources. Previous 
contributions show that credit constraints can have large negative effects on firm growth (Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005), sales growth (Minetti and Chun Zhu, 2011) and 
                                                        
23
 In many cases the BEEPS firm name did not correspond exactly to its legal name in Orbis, which often includes 
legal designations such as “Ltd.” and “Inc.”. 
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investments (Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010). Credit constraints can also constrict local 
employment as firms decrease their payroll to levels commensurate with internal funding sources 
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014). 
Our matched data now contain information on firms’ credit constraints in 2008-09 (taken 
from BEEPS) and information on their subsequent (2008-10) and prior (2005-07) growth 
performance (taken from Orbis). We use these matched data to estimate a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) model to assess the real effects of having relationship banks in the vicinity during a 
downturn. Specifically, we instrument the 2008-09 binary variable Credit constrained by Share 
relationship banks (while also including our standard set of covariates) to extract the exogenous 
element of credit constraints as determined by the local share of relationship banks. This first-
stage regression thus equals our earlier baseline specification (Table 5, column 8). Our 
identifying assumption is that the local banking structure in terms of lending techniques only 
affects firm growth through its impact on firms’ ability to access credit.24 
In the second stage, presented in Table 11, we use the predicted credit constraints to explain 
growth in total assets (column 1), operating revenues (column 4), and number of employees 
(column 7) in 2008-2010. The results suggest that where a high presence of relationship banks 
reduces credit constraints in a locality, this is associated with higher subsequent firm growth. In 
statistical terms this impact is strongest for the growth in firm assets and operating revenues and 
somewhat less strong (10 percent level) for the growth in employees. This likely reflects that 
hiring and firing decisions are taken irregularly as firms try to smooth employment fluctuations. 
In economic terms the effects are substantial too. A credit-constrained firm contracted its assets 
and operating revenues by 1.1 and 3.2 times more over the subsequent two years compared with 
an unconstrained firm, all else equal. Credit-constrained firms also reduced their number of 
employees by 1.3 times more over that period (see Table 1 for summary statistics). 
                                                        
24
 We have firm balance sheet information available for this matched dataset. Our results remain robust when 
replacing our firm size dummy variables with total assets as well as including other commonly used accounting 
variables such as the current ratio, solvability ratio, and liquidity ratio. 
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In line with our discussion in previous sections, Share relationship banks reduces credit 
constraints significantly in the first stage, suggesting that this variable is a strong instrument. The 
first-stage R
2
 is reasonable too. However, the F-statistic based on the first-stage regressions lies 
between 3 and 5, below the often used rule-of-thumb of 10. This indicates that there are limits to 
the strength of our instrument. We therefore interpret the 2SLS results mainly as suggestive 
evidence of positive real impacts due to local relationship lending. However, they are clearly at 
odds with a more negative ‘evergreening’ interpretation of our core results. 
A comparison of the 2SLS results with OLS estimations (presented in columns 2, 5, and 8) 
shows that without instrumenting credit constraints, we do not detect a significant effect of 
constraints on subsequent firm performance.
25
 Biases in the OLS regressions, however, may 
mask the causal impact of credit constraints on firm performance. For example, being credit 
constrained may be correlated with firm characteristics that are unobservable to us but were 
observable to loan officers. Badly managed firms may have been rationed more and such firms 
may also have been more negatively impacted during the economic downturn.  
Finally, we present 2SLS regressions in columns 3, 6 and 9 where we measure firm growth 
variables over the period 2005-07 instead of 2008-10. In essence this amounts to a placebo test to 
assess whether firm-level credit constraints in 2008 also ‘caused’ higher firm growth in the 
preceding years 2005-2007. The absence of any impact here gives us further confidence that our 
results for 2008-10 (in columns 1, 4, and 7) indeed reflect a causal effect of credit constraints on 
firm performance and not merely a selection effect. After all, if relationship banks would have 
targeted firms that were already performing relatively well before the crisis (or if such banks 
would have been based in localities with many of such fast growing firms) then these placebo 
regressions should pick up such a selection effect. We also find no negative impact on 2005-07 
firm growth. This is reassuring too as such a negative effect could have reflected that 
‘evergreening’ relationship banks were mainly selecting underperforming firms. 
                                                        
25
 Both a Durbin test and a Wu-Watson test indicate that our variable Credit constrained cannot be treated as 
exogenous and that 2SLS is therefore the preferred estimation method.  
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[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
We collect information from 21 countries on the bank branches active in the direct vicinity of a 
large sample of surveyed firms. Using information provided by CEOs of these banks themselves, 
we are able to determine whether the banks in the vicinity of each firm are either relationship or 
transaction banks. Using these unique data, we examine the impact of relationship lending on 
firms’ credit constraints at different points in the business cycle. 
We find evidence that the importance of lending techniques for firms’ financing constraints 
varies strongly over the credit cycle. While transaction and relationship lending are substitutes 
during good times, relationship lending appears to be a more adequate lending technique during 
cyclical downturns. This holds in particular for smaller, younger and more opaque firms with 
less collateral to pledge. This easing effect of relationship banks on credit constraints is 
especially prominent in adverse macroeconomic environments and holds across countries at 
different stages of economic development. It holds when we control for various other local 
banking characteristics, such as bank size, ownership, and funding structure. 
Our results are in line with relationship banks smoothing the negative impact of credit cycle 
downturns after having acquired sufficient information about their borrowers during good times. 
This enables them to continue to provide loans during economic downturns when transaction 
banks seem to withdraw. Our evidence suggests that such different lending behavior during 
downturns also has real consequences for local firm growth. That is, the extent to which local 
bank branches rely on transactional as opposed to relationship lending techniques exacerbates the 
procyclical impact of local bank lending. 
Recently, several commentators have urged banks to go “back to basics” and to put more 
emphasis on relationship lending as this may insure firms against unexpected economic shocks.
26
 
                                                        
26
 For example, “Local Banks for Local People” (The Telegraph, 28-05-2013) and, for a contrarian view, “Let's 
Abolish Wall Street and Return to Local Banking!” (Forbes, 13-09-2012). 
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Some bankers also concede that the screening of loan applicants became more challenging when 
the credit cycle turned. Loan officers can now rely less on collateral and hard information and 
instead need to take a deeper look at firms’ prospects. This requires a more subtle judgment and 
“softer” information, such as about the ability and commitment of firm owners and management 
(IIF, 2013). Our results concur with this anecdotal evidence as we find that not all banks are 
equally equipped to produce such judgments during a cyclical downturn. 
Our results have important policy implications. While the recent literature has clearly pointed 
to the benefits of diverse lending techniques within a banking system, relationship lending 
appears to have a more prominent role to play during economic downturns. The effect of a 
financial crisis on the real economy would therefore likely be smaller if more firms could be 
induced to seek a long-term banking relationship and if relationship banks would be more 
shielded from the effects of a financial crisis, for example by holding more capital. 
Supporting the collection of the necessary “hard” information about SMEs through credit 
registries and thus incentivizing banks to invest more in generating “soft” information 
themselves is another important policy message supported by our findings (Karapetyan and 
Stacescu, 2014). Relatedly, our results also warn against an excessive short-term focus by banks, 
and their shareholders, on reducing costs by laying off loan officers and other frontline staff. In 
the medium term, and especially when an economic boom turns to bust, such cuts may 
negatively affect banks’ ability to continue to distinguish between firms with and without 
adequate growth prospects. 
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N Mean Median Sd Min Max N Mean Median Sd Min Max 
Firm-level variables
Loan needed 7,053   0.70 1 0.46 0 1 7,047   0.62 1 0.48 0 1
Constrained 4,909   0.34 0 0.48 0 1 4,382   0.40 0 0.49 0 1
Small firm (< 20 employees) 7,053   0.55 1 0.50 0 1 7,045   0.42 0 0.49 0 1
Large firm (> 100 employees) 7,053   0.18 0 0.38 0 1 7,045   0.25 0 0.43 0 1
Publicly listed 7,053   0.02 0 0.14 0 1 7,111   0.12 0 0.32 0 1
Sole proprietorship 7,053   0.36 0 0.48 0 1 7,111   0.18 0 0.38 0 1
Privatized 7,053   0.12 0 0.33 0 1 7,111   0.18 0 0.38 0 1
Exporter 7,053   0.27 0 0.45 0 1 7,111   0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Subsidized 7,053   0.09 0 0.29 0 1 7,111   0.09 0 0.29 0 1
Competition 7,053   0.88 1 0.32 0 1 7,111   0.77 1 0.42 0 1
Employees (log) 7,053   3.09 2.77 1.57 1.10 9.16 7,045   3.51 3.30 1.39 0 9.81
Age (log) 7,045   2.45 2.40 0.74 1.39 5.19 6,972   2.54 2.56 0.70 0 5.21
External funding 7,053   0.21 0 0.40 0 1 7,111   0.22 0 0.41 0 1
Audited 6,881   0.47 0 0.50 0 1 6,922   0.46 0 0.50 0 1
Asset tangibility 2,834   0.46 0 0.50 0 1 2,686   0.51 1 0.50 0 1
Growth total assets (log diff.) 1,338 0.35 0.27 0.63 -5.48 5.73 1,519 -0.03 -0.02 0.52 -8.34 5.35
Growth operational revenue (log diff.) 1,454 0.33 0.28 0.67 -4.55 5.14 1,686 -0.31 -0.21 0.77 -6.77 3.95
Growth employees (lof diff.) 1,301 0.16 0.06 0.63 -6.13 5.31 1,615 -0.19 -0.08 0.57 -4.96 4.87
Locality-level variables
Share relationship banks 6,706   0.53 0.57 0.27 0 1 7,025   0.50 0.50 0.23 0 1
Share foreign banks 7,053   0.52 0.59 0.31 0 1 7,111   0.58 0.64 0.28 0 1
Tier 1 6,898   11.96 9.58 5.59 6.5 41.3 6,962   10.68 9.13 3.86 5.51 41.4
Wholesale funding 7,016   111.94 113.81 30.77 23.94 243.79 7,098   130.93 120.65 40.75 51.10 495.88
Capital 7,053   0.34 0 0.47 0 1 7,111   0.32 0 0.46 0 1
City 7,053   0.43 0 0.50 0 1 7,111   0.37 0 0.48 0 1
HHI 7,053   0.22 0.16 0.18 0.06 1 7,111   0.18 0.13 0.18 0.05 1
Lerner 6,989   0.40 0.41 0.06 0.14 0.73 7,094   0.40 0.40 0.05 0.17 0.65
Relationship banks (continuous) 6,706   3.39 3.50 0.45 2.00 4.00 7,025   3.38 3.44 0.36 2.00 4.00
Relationship banks (relative) 6,706   0.93 0.94 0.15 0.50 4.00 7,025   0.93 0.93 0.12 0.50 2.50
Share transaction banks 6,706   0.36 0.34 0.26 0 1 7,025   0.39 0.39 0.25 0 1
Share relationship banks (1995) 6,000   0.58 0.62 0.31 0 1 5,987   0.53 0.50 0.32 0 1
Share relationship banks (2000) 6,133   0.55 0.55 0.29 0 1 6,318   0.48 0.49 0.30 0 1
2005 2008-09
Table 1
Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. Sd: standard deviation. Growth total assets, Growth operational revenues, and Growth 
employees are measured over the period 2005-2007 (left side of the table) and 2008-2010 (right side of the table). All variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
Appendix Table A1. 
2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09
Albania 0.67 0.43 0.29 0.36 0.92 0.83
Armenia 0.74 0.59 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.46
Azerbaijan 0.52 0.55 0.64 0.78 0.36 0.45
Belarus 0.79 0.75 0.45 0.34 0.26 0.27
Bosnia 0.75 0.78 0.20 0.36 0.59 0.56
Bulgaria 0.67 0.58 0.35 0.48 0.84 0.77
Croatia 0.78 0.64 0.13 0.36 0.74 0.71
Czech Republic 0.55 0.52 0.41 0.30 1.00 0.90
Estonia 0.60 0.54 0.23 0.25 0.57 0.53
Georgia 0.62 0.64 0.36 0.36 0.18 0.19
Hungary 0.78 0.41 0.28 0.32 0.60 0.58
Latvia 0.70 0.59 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.45
Lithuania 0.71 0.60 0.29 0.22 0.61 0.59
Macedonia 0.67 0.60 0.55 0.49 0.40 0.39
Moldova 0.79 0.71 0.31 0.41 0.27 0.28
Poland 0.68 0.54 0.45 0.38 0.60 0.59
Romania 0.72 0.63 0.31 0.29 0.58 0.55
Serbia 0.76 0.77 0.37 0.38 0.81 0.79
Slovak Republic 0.61 0.54 0.21 0.38 0.27 0.31
Slovenia 0.72 0.64 0.12 0.17 0.67 0.64
Ukraine 0.69 0.68 0.37 0.51 0.11 0.27
Table 2 
Relationship Banking and Credit Constraints
Loan needed Constrained Share relationship 
banks
This table shows country means for some of our main variables. Loan needed indicates the 
proportion of firms that needed a loan during the last fiscal year. Constrained indicates the 
proportion of firms that needed a loan but were either discouraged from applying for one or 
were rejected when they applied. Share relationship banks is the number of branches of 
relationship banks in a locality divided by the total number of bank branches in that locality, 
averaged across all BEEPS localities in a country. 
Share 
relationship 
banks < 
median
Share 
relationship 
banks > 
median
t-test of 
equal 
shares     
(p-value)
Share 
relationship 
banks < 
median
Share 
relationship 
banks > 
median
t-test of 
equal 
shares     
(p-value)
Share 
relationship 
banks < 
median
Share 
relationship 
banks > 
median
t-test of 
equal 
shares     
(p-value)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Number of branches 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.48 0.42 0.57 0.65 0.61 0.57
Total assets 0.57 0.57 0.95 0.42 0.53 0.30 0.67 0.59 0.22
Average branch size 0.58 0.56 0.69 0.51 0.42 0.40 0.60 0.65 0.51
Loan-to-assets ratio 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.84 0.67 0.59 0.25
Wholesale funding 0.56 0.58 0.73 0.51 0.32 0.11 0.60 0.63 0.70
Wholesale funding (parent) 0.59 0.55 0.57 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.69 0.60 0.27
Tier 1 ratio 0.52 0.63 0.12 0.44 0.57 0.31 0.56 0.66 0.26
Tier 1 ratio (parent) 0.60 0.58 0.78 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.62 0.63 0.89
Local distance 0.55 0.59 0.45 0.51 0.39 0.23 0.57 0.67 0.12
Hierarchical distance 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.46 0.44 0.81 0.61 0.67 0.37
Share localities with branch 0.53 0.63 0.06 0.40 0.52 0.22 0.58 0.67 0.20
Share branches outside main cities 0.57 0.58 0.77 0.45 0.46 0.90 0.62 0.64 0.77
All banks Domestic banks Foreign banks
Table 3
Comparing Relationship with Non-Relationship Banks
This table compares relationship with non-relationship banks along a number of characteristics. Columns [1]-[3] refer to the full sample while columns [4]-[6] and [7]-[9] 
analyse domestic and foreign banks, respectively. In each of these three sets of columns, the first two columns indicate the percentage of all banks with a below-median 
value (odd column) and an above-median value (even column) and that is a relationship bank. For instance, of all banks with a below (above) median number of branches 
in a country 59 (56) per cent is a relationship bank. A formal t-test indicates that these shares do not differ significantly. Average branch size is the ratio between total 
bank assets and the number of branches. Local distance is the average km distance (log) between the branches in a locality and their domestic HQ. Hierarchical distance 
is the number of hierarchical layers within the bank that is involved in the approval of SME loans. Share localities with branch is the number of localities in which a bank 
has a branch as a proportion of all localities in a country with at least one branch. Share branches outside main cities is the share of a bank's branches located in cities with 
less than one million inhabitants. All other variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. 
Locality 5 km 10 km Locality 5 km 10 km 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Share relationship banks -0.082 0.024 0.028 0.046 0.051 0.089
(0.157) (0.141) (0.163) (0.139) (0.122) (0.138)
Competition 0.317*** 0.309*** 0.311*** 0.250*** 0.246*** 0.239***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042)
Subsidized 0.264*** 0.278*** 0.266*** 0.297*** 0.294*** 0.288***
(0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.081)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 6,451 6,739 6,631 6,616 6,670 6,821
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.055 0.054
2005 2008-09
Table 4
Relationship Banking and Credit Demand Through the Credit Cycle
This table shows first-stage Heckman selection regressions to estimate the impact of the local presence of 
relationship banks on firms' demand for bank credit during the credit boom (2005) and crunch (2008-09). The 
first (last) three columns show 2005 (2008-09) estimates. Local banking variables used in columns [1] and [4] 
are defined at the level of the locality where a firm is based whereas those used in columns [2],[5] and [3],[6] are 
constructed by considering the bank branches in a spatial ring around the firm with a 5 or 10 km radius, 
respectively. In all regressions the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is '1' if the firm needed credit. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parentheses.  ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level of significance, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions. Firm and 
locality covariates are the same as those included in Table 4. 
Locality 5 km 10 km Locality 5 km 10 km
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Share relationship banks 0.081 0.017 0.191 0.169 0.240 0.159 -0.407*** -0.431*** -0.470*** -0.439*** -0.427*** -0.403**
(0.241) (0.246) (0.270) (0.244) (0.200) (0.202) (0.127) (0.134) (0.152) (0.156) (0.162) (0.182)
Small firm (<20 empl) 0.482*** 0.503*** 0.449*** 0.431*** 0.456*** 0.370*** 0.373*** 0.351*** 0.335*** 0.348***
(0.045) (0.050) (0.080) (0.075) (0.079) (0.051) (0.051) (0.057) (0.064) (0.071)
Large firm (>100 empl) -0.326*** -0.297*** -0.286*** -0.313*** -0.300*** -0.272*** -0.271*** -0.232*** -0.226*** -0.221**
(0.095) (0.096) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.043) (0.046) (0.066) (0.080) (0.087)
Publicly listed -0.169 -0.174 -0.143 -0.150 -0.152 0.237*** 0.244*** 0.229*** 0.222*** 0.209***
(0.167) (0.166) (0.154) (0.148) (0.155) (0.072) (0.073) (0.070) (0.067) (0.067)
Sole proprietorship 0.063 0.075 0.098 0.076 0.085 0.114** 0.124** 0.126** 0.135** 0.116**
(0.069) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066) (0.053) (0.052) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056)
Privatized -0.032 0.013 0.025 0.011 0.014 0.086 0.103 0.114 0.127* 0.130*
(0.057) (0.059) (0.061) (0.057) (0.058) (0.080) (0.081) (0.078) (0.077) (0.075)
Exporter -0.249*** -0.258*** -0.224*** -0.232*** -0.239*** -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.184*** -0.170** -0.171**
(0.054) (0.056) (0.067) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) (0.055) (0.063) (0.067) (0.069)
Audited -0.252*** -0.275*** -0.260*** -0.279*** -0.264*** -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.200*** -0.181*** -0.170***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.059) (0.060) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059)
Tier 1 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 -0.017* -0.017 -0.015 -0.019
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Share foreign banks 0.128 0.162 0.099 0.362 -0.106 -0.037 -0.064 0.127
(0.345) (0.324) (0.331) (0.323) (0.254) (0.264) (0.261) (0.312)
Wholesale funding -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Capital 0.184** 0.152* 0.139* 0.158** 0.031 0.005 -0.017 -0.012
(0.089) (0.085) (0.081) (0.080) (0.077) (0.093) (0.097) (0.098)
City -0.107* -0.104* -0.115*** -0.083 -0.040 -0.030 0.002 -0.004
(0.058) (0.053) (0.042) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.052) (0.056)
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.482 0.479 0.432 0.292 0.384 0.385
(0.362) (0.346) (0.359) (0.269) (0.286) (0.284)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 4,690 4,610 4,527 4,527 4,693 4,651 4,235 4,105 4,077 4,085 4,121 4,208
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Table 5
Relationship Banking and Credit Constraints Through the Credit Cycle
HeckmanHeckmanProbit
Locality
Probit
Locality
2005 2008-09
This table shows baseline regressions to estimate the impact of the local presence of relationship banks on firms' access to bank credit during the credit boom (2005) and the credit crunch (2008-09). The 
first (last) six columns show 2005 (2008-09) estimates. Columns [1]-[3] and [7]-[9] show probit regressions while the other columns show second-stage results of a Heckman selection procedure (the 
excluded variables in the first stage are Competition and Subsidized). Local banking variables used in columns [1]-[4] and [7]-[10] are defined at the level of the locality where the firm is based whereas 
those used in columns [5],[6] and [11],[12] are constructed by taking into account the bank branches in a spatial ring around the firm with a 5 or 10 km radius, respectively. In all regressions the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that is '1' if the firm was credit constrained. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 
2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
0.089 -0.233** -0.115 -0.520* 0.209 -0.455** -0.203 0.413** 0.078 -0.293* -9.228* 11.387**
(0.153) (0.116) (0.268) (0.279) (0.242) (0.219) (0.256) (0.192) (0.173) (0.167) (4.746) (4.855)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 4,527 4,085 4,527 4,085 4,527 4,083 4,527 4,085 4,527 4,085 4,798 4,012
Pseudo R2 0.131 0.098 0.131 0.098 0.132 0.099 0.132 0.099 0.092 0.049 0.059 0.035
Narrow constrained Bank-funded fixed 
assets
Table 6
Relationship Banking and Credit Constraints: Robustness Tests (I)
Share relationship banks 
Relationship banks 
(continuous)
Relationship banks 
(relative to other 
lending techniques)
Relationship banks 
(relative to retail 
borrowers)
Share transaction 
banks
This table shows various robustness tests of our baseline results in Table 5. In all regressions except those in columns [11] and [12] the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is 
'1' if the firm was credit constrained. All local banking variables are defined at the level of the locality where a firm is based. In columns [1]-[2] the main independent variable is a 
branch-weighted average of how banks in a locality rate the importance of relationship lending on a 5-point scale (ranging from 0 to 4). In columns [3]-[4] the main independent 
variable is a branch-weighted average of how banks in a locality rate the importance of relationship lending on a 5-point scale relative to their rating of fundamental/cash flow-based 
lending on a 5-point scale. In columns [5]-[6] the main independent variable is the number of branches of banks for whom relationship lending is a "Very important" lending 
technique for SMEs but not for retail clients/total no. of branches in the locality. In columns [7]-[8] the main independent variable is the number of branches of transaction banks/total 
no. bank branches in the locality. Transaction banks are those for whom fundamental/cash-flow-based lending is a "Very important" lending technique while relationship lending is 
not a very important lending technique. Columns [9]-[10] show regressions for a more narrowly defined credit-constrained variable. Columns [11]-[12] use the percentage of fixed 
assets funded through bank credit as an alternative dependent variable. Unreported covariates are the same as in Table 5. Robust standard errors are clustered by country shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions. 
Pooled 
sample
2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005; 
2008-09
2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]
0.169 -0.439*** 0.067 -0.152*** 0.182 -0.421*** 0.182 -0.436*** 0.169 -0.425*** 0.174 0.258 -0.471*** 0.327* -0.313*
(0.212) (0.155) (0.084) (0.054) (0.259) (0.149) (0.263) (0.157) (0.247) (0.153) (0.252) (0.228) (0.173) (0.198) (0.184)
HHI -0.167 0.348**
(0.141) (0.153)
Lerner index -0.415 0.504
(0.846) (1.084)
Share small banks -0.072 -0.100
(0.404) (0.165)
-0.607**
(0.284)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 4,527 4,085 4,527 4,085 4,527 4,085 4,519 4,084 4,525 4,083 8,612 4,138 3,545 4,527 4,085
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.099 0.146 0.118 0.132 0.100 0.132 0.099 0.132 0.099 0.119 0.136 0.098 0.132 0.099
Table 7
Relationship Banking and Credit Constraints: Robustness Tests (II)
Excl. banks with 
ownership change
Share relationship 
banks*2008-09
Share relationship banks 
Clustering at 
locality level
Additional controls local credit marketsLinear probability 
model, wild cluster 
bootstrapped s.e.
Excluding Ukraine
This table shows various robustness tests of our baseline results in Table 5. In all regressions the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is '1' if the firm was credit constrained. All local banking variables are defined at 
the level of the locality where a firm is based. Unreported covariates are the same as in Table 5. Robust standard errors are clustered by locality in columns [1]-[2] and by country in all other columns and shown in 
parentheses. Standard errors in columns [3]-[4] are Wild cluster bootstrapped. Columns [5]-[6] include a locality-level and branch-weighted Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) that measures local credit-market 
concentration. Columns [7]-[8] include a locality-level and branch-weighted Lerner index to measure local credit-market competition. Columns [9]-[10] include the local branch-weighted market share of small banks (assets 
<1 billion euro). Column [11] is estimated for a pooled 2005-08/09 sample. Columns [12]-[13] exclude all Ukrainian observations. Columns [14]-[15] exclude banks with ownership change in computing Share relationship 
2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09 2005 2008-09
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Share relationship banks 0.125 -0.478*** 0.147 -0.464** 0.044 -0.346*** 0.178 -0.299**
(0.237) (0.157) (0.262) (0.212) (0.211) (0.073) (0.146) (0.128)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 4,174 3,738 2,153 2,525 4,063 3,537 4,137 3,683
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.103 0.158 0.111 0.134 0.099 0.134 0.100
Table 8
Relationship Banking and Credit Constraints: Endogeneity
Firms 5 years and 
older
Firms 12 years and 
older
Share relationship 
banks (1995)
Share relationship 
banks (2000)
This table shows alternative specifications of our baseline regressions in Table 5 to address possible endogeneity concerns. In all regressions 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is '1' if the firm was credit constrained. All local banking variables are defined at the level of 
the locality where a firm is based. Unreported covariates are the same as in Table 5. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and 
shown in parentheses. Columns [1]-[2] and [3-4] are based on samples that exclude firms younger than 5 and 12 years, respectively (12 years 
is the median firm age in the total sample). In columns [5]-[6] and [7]-[8] the contemporaneous share of relationship banks in each locality is 
replaced by the historical share of these banks in 1995 and 2000, respectively. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
Firm type → Employees Age Exporter Audited External 
funding
Publicly 
listed
Asset 
tangibility
Employees Age Exporter Audited External 
funding
Publicly 
listed
Asset 
tangibility
[1] [2] [3] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]
0.055 0.089 0.148 0.296 0.102 0.173 -0.008 -1.040*** -1.065*** -0.572*** -0.598*** -0.532*** -0.535*** -0.431*
(0.380) (0.514) (0.262) (0.240) (0.265) (0.244) (0.347) (0.312) (0.364) (0.192) (0.182) (0.170) (0.165) (0.257)
0.028 0.032 0.082 -0.278** 0.304 -0.233 -0.034 0.181** 0.244** 0.409* 0.333* 0.448*** 0.594** 0.448**
(0.070) (0.165) (0.295) (0.138) (0.270) (0.579) (0.243) (0.078) (0.123) (0.219) (0.188) (0.167) (0.250) (0.205)
Firm type -0.262*** 0.088 -0.269* -0.116 0.094 -0.002 -0.339** -0.282*** -0.139* -0.391*** -0.363*** -0.184** -0.045 -0.372***
(0.080) (0.076) (0.157) (0.076) (0.153) (0.381) (0.144) (0.062) (0.073) (0.116) (0.115) (0.089) (0.132) (0.090)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of obs. 4,527 4,520 4,527 4,527 4,527 4,527 1,929 4,085 4,023 4,085 4,085 4,085 4,085 1,652
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.134 0.132 0.132 0.136 0.132 0.168 0.107 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.100 0.122
Share relationship banks * 
Firm type
2005 2008-09
Relationship Banking and Credit Constraints Through the Credit Cycle: Firm Heterogeneity
Table 9
Share relationship banks 
This table shows regressions to estimate how the impact of the local presence of relationship lenders on firms' access to debt finance during the credit boom (2005) and the credit crunch (2008-09) differed across firm types. The first 
(last) eight columns show 2005 (2008-09) estimates. All columns show second-stage results of a Heckman selection procedure (the excluded variables in the first stage are Competition and Subsidized) where Share relationship banks 
is measured at the locality level. Firm controls: Small firm, Large firm, Publicly listed, Sole proprietorship, Privatized, Exporter, Audited. Locality controls: Tier 1, Share foreign bank, Wholesale funding, Capital and City. In all 
regressions the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is '1' if the firm was credit constrained. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parentheses.  ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Share relationship banks -0.324* -0.400*** -0.546*** -0.631*** -0.362** -0.444***
(0.189) (0.151) (0.206) (0.198) (0.153) (0.150)
1.869 2.510** 2.451**
(1.464) (1.237) (1.093)
1.711** 1.151** 1.229**
(0.863) (0.576) (0.481)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 4,085 4,085 3,099 3,099 4,085 4,085
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.099 0.095 0.093 0.101 0.100
Relationship Banking and Regional Business Cycle Variation
Table 10
Share relationship banks 
*Output growth 2008-09
Share relationship banks 
*Output growth 2007-09
Country GDP growth Regional GDP growth Regional GDP growth 
if available; country 
GDP growth otherwise
This table shows regressions to estimate how the impact of the local presence of relationship lenders on firms' access to credit in 
2008-09 depended on the severity of the crisis impact in the region where the firm is incorporated. Output growth is measured at the 
country level in columns [1]-[2]; at the regional level in [3]-[4]; and at the regional level where available and country level 
otherwise in [5]-[6]. All columns show second-stage results of a Heckman selection procedure (the excluded variables in the first 
stage are Competition and Subsidized) where Share relationship banks is measured at the locality level. Firm controls: Small firm, 
Large firm, Publicly listed, Sole proprietorship, Privatized, Exporter, Audited. Locality controls: Tier 1, Share foreign bank, 
Wholesale funding, Capital and City. In all regressions the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is '1' if the firm was credit 
constrained. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parentheses.  ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level of significance, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions. 
2005-2007 2005-2007 2005-2007
2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Credit constrained 2008 -1.149** -0.039 0.036 -3.202** -0.061 -1.058 -1.322* -0.076 -0.348
(0.525) (0.038) (0.420) (1.564) (0.059) (1.056) (0.746) (0.059) (0.733)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 4.74 - 5.17 3.13 - 1.66 3.32 - 2.78
P-value F-stat 0.046 - 0.037 0.095 - 0.216 0.088 - 0.114
R2 (first stage) 0.110 - 0.122 0.118 - 0.135 0.117 - 0.132
Share relationship banks -0.215** - -0.211** -0.162* - -0.133 -0.162* - -0.181*
(first-stage) (0.096) - (0.090) (0.089) - (0.101) (0.087) - (0.106)
Number of obs. 877 886 759 967 977 822 765 938 765
Pseudo R2 - 0.023 - - 0.031 - - 0.026 -
Growth number of employees
Table 11
The Real Effects of Relationship Banking
Growth total assets
2008-2010 2008-2010 2008-2010
Growth operating revenues
This table shows OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions to estimate the impact of firm-level credit constraints in 2008 on firms' asset growth 
(columns [1]-[3]), growth in operational revenues (columns [4]-[6]), and growth in the number of employees (columns [7]-[9]). In the 2SLS regressions the first-
stage instrument is Share relationship banks as measured at the locality level. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parentheses.  ***, **, * 
correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions. Firm and locality covariates are 
the same as those included in Table 5. 
Figure 1 
The Credit Cycle Across Emerging Europe
This figure shows annual nominal credit growth (%) across emerging Europe over the period 2005-13. The bars and line 
indicate total and corporate credit growth, respectively. Growth rates are based on the difference in end-year credit stocks. 
Source: CEIC. 
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Figure 2 
Regional Variation in Relationship Banking
This heat map plots the geographical localities in our dataset. Each dot indicates a locality that contains at least one 
surveyed firm. Darker colors indicate a higher proportion of bank branches owned by relationship banks. Relationship 
banks are defined as banks whose CEO mentioned that relationship lending was a "Very important" technique when 
lending to SMEs. 
Source Unit
Firm-level variables
Loan needed BEEPS 0/1
Constrained BEEPS 0/1
Narrow constrained BEEPS 0/1
Bank-funded fixed assets BEEPS %
Small firm (< 20 empl) BEEPS 0/1
Large firm (> 100 empl) BEEPS 0/1
Public BEEPS 0/1
Sole proprietorship BEEPS 0/1
Privatized BEEPS 0/1
Exporter BEEPS 0/1
Subsidized BEEPS 0/1
Competition BEEPS 0/1
Employees (log) BEEPS -
Age (log) BEEPS -
External funding BEEPS 0/1
Audited BEEPS 0/1
Asset tangibility Aghion and 
Kharroubi (2013)
0/1
Growth total assets Orbis %
Growth operating revenues Orbis %
Growth number of employees Orbis %
Share relationship banks BEPS Share
Share foreign banks BEPS Share
Share small banks BankScope/BEPS Share
HHI Locality-level Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. Market shares measured by branches. BEPS Share
Lerner index BankScope/BEPS Share
Country GDP growth IMF %
Regional GDP growth National sources %
Bank health Share of banks in a locality with a tier 1 ratio above the 2007 country mean (branch weighted) BankScope/BEPS Share
Tier 1 BankScope/BEPS Share
Wholesale funding BankScope/BEPS Share
Capital BEPS 0/1
Hierarchical distance BEPS Share
Relationship banks 
(continuous)
BEPS Share
Relationship banks (relative to 
other lending techniques)
BEPS Share
Relationship banks (relative to 
retail borrowers)
BEPS Share
Share relationship banks 
(1995)
BEPS Share
Share relationship banks 
(2000)
BEPS Share
Share transaction banks BEPS ShareNo. branches of transaction banks/total no. bank branches in the locality. Transaction banks are those for whom 
fundamental/cash-flow-based lending is a "Very important" lending technique while relationship lending is not a 
"Very important" lending technique.
 Growth of a firm's total assets (log difference) 
 Growth of a firm's annual operational revenues (log difference) 
 Growth of a firm's total number of employees (log difference) 
 No. branches of relationship banks/total no. bank branches in the locality in 1995. Relationship banks are those 
banks for whom relationship lending is a "Very important" lending technique 
 No. branches of relationship banks/total no. bank branches in the locality in 2000. Relationship banks are those 
banks for whom relationship lending is a "Very important" lending technique 
 Branch-weighted average of how banks in a locality rate the importance of relationship lending on a 5-point scale 
(ranging from 0 to 4) 
Branch-weighted average of how banks in a locality rate the importance of relationship lending on a 5-point scale 
relative  to their rating of the main alternative lending technique, fundamental/cash flow-based lending
 No. branches of relationship banks where only one hierarchical layer is involved in the approval of SME credit 
loans/total no. bank branches in the locality 
Average tier 1 capital ratio of banks in a locality (branch weighted)
Average wholesale funding (gross loans/customer funding ratio) of banks in a locality (branch weighted)
Dummy= 1 if locality is the capital of the country; 0 otherwise
 Locality-level Lerner index. Branch-weighted average of Lerner index as estimated for each bank 
Real GDP growth in a country
Real GDP growth in a region
 No. branches of banks for whom relationship lending is "Very important" for SME but not for retail lending/total 
no. bank branches in the locality. 
Table A1
Variable Definitions and Sources
 Dummy =1 if firm is state-owned, foreign-owned, and/or has publicly traded shares; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy=1 if firm needs a loan; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy=1 if firm needs a loan but was discouraged from applying or rejected when it applied; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy= 1 if firm employs less than 20 people; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy= 1 if firm employs more than 100 people; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy=1 if firm is a shareholder company with publicly traded shares; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy=1 if firm is a sole proprietorship; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy=1 if firm is a former state enterprise that was subsequently privatized; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy=1 if part or all of the firm's production is exported; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy=1 if over the last three years the firm received any subsidies from a local or national government or the 
EU; 0 otherwise  Dummy=1 if firm judges competitive pressure to be fairly severe, severe, or very severe; 0 otherwise 
 Log of the number of permanent, full-time employees of the firm at end of last fiscal year  
 Log of the firm age in years 
Definition
 Dummy =1 if the financial statements of the firm are audited by an external auditor; 0 otherwise 
 Dummy= 1 if the firm is in an industry with an above-median fraction of assets represented by net property, plant 
and equipment for US firms in the same industry during 1980–89; 0 otherwise 
No. branches of banks with less than EUR 1 billion in assets/total no. bank branches in the locality
 No. branches of relationship banks/total no. bank branches in the locality. Relationship banks are those banks for 
whom relationship lending is a "Very important" lending technique N . branches of foreign-owned banks/total no. bank branches in the locality
 Dummy=1 if firm needs a loan but was discouraged from applying or rejected when it applied (except for firms 
that were discouraged due to high interest rates); 0 otherwise 
 Percentage of firm's fixed assets funded through bank credit 
This table shows variables definitions and data sources for all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Figure A1 
Regional Distribution of Bank Branches and Firms
This map plots the geographical localities of all bank branches (2009, green dots) and firms (2009, red dots) in our 
dataset . Source: BEPS II (banks) and BEEPS 2008-09 surveys. 
		
